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Recent	  times	  have	  witnessed	  an	   increasing	   level	  of	   interest	   in	  Kant’s	  transcendental	  philosophy	  on	  
the	   part	   of	   philosophers	   of	   science.	   Not	   only	   did	   Kant’s	   philosophy	   and	   neo-­‐Kantianism	   at	   the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  deeply	  influence	  the	  logical	  positivist	  movement,	  and	  hence	  the	  
very	   same	   roots	   of	   philosophy	   of	   science	   as	   a	   discipline	   (e.g.,	  M.	   Friedman,	  Reconsidering	   Logical	  
Positivism,	  1999;	  and	  A	  Parting	  of	  the	  Ways:	  Carnap,	  Cassirer,	  Heidegger,	  2000),	  but,	  together	  with	  
Husserl’s	   phenomenology,	   they	  have	   also	  proved	  pivotal	   to	   the	  understanding,	   interpretation	   and	  
reception	   of	   relativity	   theory	   in	   the	   twentieth	   century	   (see	   T.	   Ryckman,	   The	   Reign	   of	   Relativity,	  
2005).	  In	  the	  light	  of	  this	  increasing	  level	  of	  interest	  in	  Kant’s	  philosophy,	  Friedman	  and	  Nordmann’s	  
volume	   constitutes	   an	   essential	   addition	   to	   the	   existing	   literature.	   This	   splendid	   book	   –	   carefully	  
edited	   with	   a	   thorough	   twenty-­‐seven-­‐page	   bibliography	   –	   sheds	   light	   on	   various	   major	   aspects	  
concerning	   how	   the	   Kantian	   legacy	   could	   reach	   the	   twentieth-­‐century	   physical	   sciences	   by	  
reconstructing	  the	  far-­‐reaching	  impact	  that	  Kant’s	  philosophy	  had	  on	  nineteenth-­‐century	  sciences	  in	  
the	   first	   place.	   There	   are	   at	   least	   five	  main	   aspects	   of	   the	   Kantian	   legacy	   addressed	   in	   the	   book	  
across	  various	  articles.	  I	  summarise	  them	  briefly	  here,	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  simplifying	  and	  not	  doing	  justice	  
to	  the	  great	  complexity	  of	  the	  material	  covered	  in	  each	  article.	  	  
The	   first	   aspect	   concerns	   of	   course	   the	   crucial	   role	   that	   Kant’s	   dynamic	   theory	   of	  matter	  
exposed	   in	   the	   Metaphysical	   Foundations	   of	   Natural	   Science	   (1786)	   played	   for	   the	   Romantic	  
Naturphilosophie	   of	   Schelling,	   Schlegel,	   Goethe,	   and	   Novalis,	   among	   others	   (see	   Beiser’s	   and	  
Richards’	   articles).	   In	   the	   chapter	   on	   the	   Metaphysical	   Foundations	   of	   Dynamics,	   Kant	   famously	  
schematized	  the	  empirical	  concept	  of	  matter	  according	  to	  the	  category	  of	  quality	  as	  the	   ‘movable’	  
that	  fills	  a	  space	  through	  a	  moving	  force.	  He	  identified	  two	  fundamental	  moving	  forces	  in	  nature:	  a	  
repulsive	  force	  responsible	  for	  matter’s	  impenetrability	  and	  an	  attractive	  force	  counterbalancing	  the	  
repulsive	  force.	  Kant’s	  aim	  was	  to	  start	  with	  these	  two	  a	  priori	  established	  moving	  forces	  in	  order	  to	  
provide	   a	   ‘top-­‐down’	   justification	   for	   his	   three	   laws	   of	   mechanics,	   and	   hence	   for	   the	   three	  
corresponding	  Newtonian	  laws	  of	  motion.	  The	  transcendental	  principles	  of	  substance,	  causality	  and	  
reciprocity	   (providing	   the	   transcendental	   backup	   for	   Kant’s	   three	   laws	   of	  mechanics)	   came	   in	   this	  
way	   to	   play	   a	   constitutive	   role	   for	   the	   objects	   of	   experience.	   This	   top-­‐down	   procedure	   found	   its	  
natural	  counterpart	  in	  a	  ‘bottom-­‐up’	  procedure	  that	  Kant	  increasingly	  developed	  from	  the	  Critique	  of	  
Judgment	  (1790)	  to	  the	  ‘Transition	  from	  the	  Metaphysical	  Foundations	  of	  Natural	  Science	  to	  Physics’	  
in	   the	   Opus	   postumum.	   According	   to	   this	   alternative	   procedure,	   we	   should	   start	   instead	   from	  
empirically	   given	   forces	   of	   matter	   and	   from	   empirical	   laws,	   such	   as	   those	   that	   the	   chemical	  
revolution	  was	  discovering	   at	   the	   end	  of	   the	   eighteenth-­‐century,	   and	   try	   to	   subsume	   them	  under	  
higher-­‐level	  yet	  still	  empirical	  laws	  so	  as	  to	  seek	  after	  a	  system	  of	  forces	  in	  nature.	  	  Systematicity	  or	  
systematic	   unity	   in	   the	   investigation	   of	   nature	   was	   presented	   as	   a	   regulative	   (as	   opposed	   to	  
constitutive)	   principle	   of	   scientific	   inquiry.	   For	   Kant,	   the	   distinction	   between	   constitutive	   and	  
regulative	  principles	  marked	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  faculty	  of	  understanding,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  
and	  the	  faculty	  of	  reason	  and	  later	  (in	  the	  third	  Critique)	  the	  faculty	  of	  reflective	  judgment,	  on	  the	  
other	   hand.	   It	   was	   precisely	   this	   demarcation	   between	   understanding	   and	   reason,	   between	  
constitutive	  versus	  regulative	  principles	  that	  the	  Romantics	  dismantled.	  
The	  Naturphilosophen	   rejected	  the	  dualism	  between	  constitutive	  and	  regulative	  principles.	  
Moreover,	   they	   gave	   a	   constitutive	   twist	   to	   the	   regulative	   principle	   of	   systematicity	   and	   to	   the	  
teleological	   judgment	   about	   a	   purposiveness	   of	   nature,	   which	   Kant	   had	   defended	   as	   a	   purely	  
regulative	  idea	  in	  the	  Critique	  of	  Judgment.	  The	  upshot	  of	  this	  manoeuvre	  for	  the	  Naturphilosophen	  
was	   to	   show	  that	  by	   starting	  with	  Kant’s	  dynamic	   theory	  of	  matter	   it	  was	  possible	   to	  explain	  how	  
nature	  dialectically	  evolved	  from	  the	  inert/lifeless	  matter	  described	  by	  Kant	  into	  the	  variety	  of	  forms	  
described	  by	  contemporary	  chemistry	  and	  biology.	  In	  this	  particular	  light,	  we	  should	  read	  Goethe’s	  
morphological	   studies	   of	   living	  organisms	   as	  well	   as	   Schelling’s	  System	  of	   Transcendental	   Idealism	  
(1800).	  	  
But	   there	  was	   also	   a	   second	   aspect	   of	   the	   legacy	   of	   Kant’s	   dynamic	   theory	   of	  matter	   for	  
nineteenth-­‐century	  science.	  Schelling’s	   reinterpretation	  of	  Kant	  had	   important	   implications	   for	   the	  
history	   of	   electromagnetism	   in	   the	   early	   nineteenth	   century.	   Michael	   Friedman,	   in	   his	   beautiful	  
article,	   reconstructs	   how	   Hans	   Christian	   Oersted’s	   discovery	   of	   electromagnetism	   was	   deeply	  
influenced	  by	  both	  Schelling’s	  Naturphilosophie,	  which	  Oersted	  came	  to	  know	  via	  Johann	  W.	  Ritter,	  
and	   by	   the	   new	   electrochemistry.	   Electrochemistry	   showed	   how	   chemical	   forces	   are	   ultimately	  
electrical.	  Schelling,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  provided	  the	  philosophical	   framework	  for	  extending	  Kant’s	  
theory	  of	  matter	  beyond	  attraction	  and	  repulsion	  and	  for	  regarding	  magnetic,	  electrical	  and	  galvanic	  
forces	  as	  a	  ‘dialectical’	  development	  of	  these	  two	  fundamental	  forces	  of	  matter.	  	  
The	  Kantian	  legacy	  for	  nineteenth-­‐century	  science	  was	  not,	  however,	  confined	  to	  the	  more	  
experimental	  aspects	  of	  the	  new	  chemistry,	  electromagnetism	  and	  biology.	  It	  extended	  also	  to	  more	  
theoretical	   aspects	   of	   mathematical	   physics.	   Frederick	   Gregory’s	   and	   Helmut	   Pulte’s	   articles,	   for	  
instance,	   focus	   on	   the	   reinterpretation	   of	   the	   Kantian	   distinction	   between	   understanding	   and	  
reason,	   constitutive	   and	   regulative	   principles	   in	   Jakob	   F.	   Fries’	   The	   Mathematical	   Philosophy	   of	  
Nature	  (1822).	  In	  the	  same	  aforementioned	  spirit	  of	  rejecting	  the	  constitutive/regulative	  distinction	  
and	   affirming	   the	   priority	   of	   the	   regulative	   over	   the	   constitutive,	   Fries	   saw	   Euler	   and	   Lagrange’s	  
principles	   of	   analytical	   mechanics	   as	   the	   result	   of	   a	   bottom-­‐up	   approach	   for	   systematizing	  
mechanical	   experience	   before	   any	   constitutive	   principle	   could	   be	   found	   and	   any	   forces	   of	  matter	  
identified.	  
Even	  more	  striking	  was	  the	  impact	  of	  Kant’s	  transcendental	  aesthetic	  for	  nineteenth-­‐century	  
geometry	   with	   the	   discovery	   of	   non-­‐Euclidean	   geometries.	   This	   is	   the	   topic	   of	   Robert	   DiSalle’s	  
intriguing	   article	   dedicated	   to	   Helmholtz’s	   sophisticated	   empiricism	   and	   its	   connection	   with	  
Poincare’s	   conventionalism.	   For	   Kant,	   the	   universal	   and	   necessary	   status	   of	   Euclidean	   geometry	  
could	  be	  traced	  back	  to	   the	   fact	   that	  objects	  are	  given	  to	   the	  mind	   in	   intuition	  according	  to	  space	  
and	  time	  as	  a	  priori	  forms	  of	  sensibility.	  	  Helmholtz	  challenged	  Kant	  on	  the	  allegedly	  necessary	  status	  
of	   Euclidean	   geometry	   by	   showing	   that	   what	   makes	   space	   seem	   Euclidean	   is	   a	   series	   of	   sense-­‐
impressions	   about	   the	   free	   mobility	   of	   rigid	   bodies	   and	   paths	   of	   light	   rays,	   and	   the	   very	   same	  
empirical	   evidence	   can	   acquaint	   us	   with	   the	   structure	   of	   a	   non-­‐Euclidean	   space;	   hence	   the	   non-­‐
necessary	   status	   of	   Euclid’s	   fifth	   postulate.	   In	   this	  way,	   Helmholtz’s	   empiricism	   paved	   the	  way	   to	  
Poincare’s	  conventionalism	  about	  geometry,	  which	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  Jeremy	  Gray’s,	  Janet	  Folina’s,	  and	  
Jesper	  Lützen’s	  articles,	  whereas	  Timothy	  Lenoir’s	  contribution	  concentrates	  on	  Helmholtz’s	  theory	  
of	  perception	  and	  Physiological	  Optics	  (1860).	  
However,	  the	  analysis	  of	  Kant’s	  legacy	  would	  have	  been	  incomplete	  if	  it	  had	  stopped	  at	  this	  
point.	  The	  fifth	  essential	  aspect	  covered	  in	  Friedman	  and	  Nordmann’s	  book	  concerns	  the	  impact	  of	  
Kant’s	   philosophy	   more	   directly	   on	   the	   epistemology	   of	   the	   late	   nineteenth	   century.	   Alan	  
Richardson’s	   article	   beautifully	   investigates	   the	   link	  with	   the	  Marburg	   School	   of	   Hermann	   Cohen.	  
Michael	   Heidelberger	   focuses	   on	   Alois	   Riehl	   and	   Moritz	   Schlick.	   And	   Alfred	   Nordmann’s	   article	  
encompasses	  Riehl,	  Cohen	  and	  Charles	  S.	  Peirce’s	  pragmatism	  and	   its	  debt	   to	  Kant.	  An	  analysis	  of	  
these	  philosophical	  points	  would	  lead	  me	  far	  from	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  review,	  and	  I	  shall	  not	  pursue	  it	  
here.	  It	  suffices	  to	  say	  that	  Richardson’s	  analysis	  of	  Hermann	  Cohen’s	  neo-­‐Kantianism	  constitutes	  a	  
very	   welcome	   contribution	   to	   one	   of	   the	   most	   relevant	   (and	   often	   overlooked)	   figures	   of	   the	  
Marburg	  School:	  Cohen’s	  reinterpretation	  of	  Kant’s	  theory	  of	  experience	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  history	  of	  
mathematical	   physics	   with	   the	   calculus	   and	   infinitesimals	   represents	   indeed	   a	   landmark	   for	   neo-­‐
Kantianism.	  
But	  there	  is	  more.	  Cohen’s	  neo-­‐Kantianism	  illuminates	  also	  a	  subtle	  and	  often	  forgotten	  link	  
between	   epistemology	   and	   philosophy	   of	   science,	   which	   is	   perhaps	   one	   of	   Kant’s	   most	   enduring	  
lessons	  for	  current	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  Philosophy	  of	  science	  is	  not	  just	  a	  branch	  of	  epistemology;	  
nor	   is	   it	  meant	   to	  be	   a	   replacement	   for	   it,	   following	  Rudolf	   Carnap.	   Instead,	   in	   the	  words	  of	  Alan	  
Richardson:	  
	  
science	  serves	  both	  as	  a	  resource	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  metaphysics	  and	  its	  sceptical	  antithesis	  and	  as	  a	  problem	  
for	  transcendental	  philosophy.	  More	  precisely,	  and	  to	  anticipate	  some	  language	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  use	  among	  the	  
Marburgers,	  the	  fact	  of	  science	  explodes	  scepticism	  and	  humbles	  metaphysics,	  while	  the	  philosophical	  account	  
of	  scientific	  objectivity	  becomes	  the	  highest	  speculative	  burden	  of	  transcendental	  philosophy	  (p.	  216).	  
	  
In	  our	   time,	  where	  metaphysics	  still	  animates	  most	  debates	   in	  philosophy	  of	  physics	  while	  
scepticism	  a`	   la	   van	  Fraassen	   is	   rampant	   in	  empiricist	  quarters,	   this	   is	  probably	   the	  most	  enduring	  
aspect	  of	  the	  Kantian	  legacy	  that	  we	  should	  have	  inherited	  from	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  science.	  
